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Abstract
A broad exploratory data analysis is conducted to assess the promise
of a kind of model in which long—term asset prices change through time
primarily due to consumption related changes in the rate of discount.
Aggregate consumption data are used to infer ex—post marginal rates of
substitution. Prices of stocks, bonds, short debt, land and housing
are examined for the period 1890 to 1980. Methods are explored of
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(617) 253—6666I. Introduction
How much do real discount rates move through time? By real discount
rate I mean the interest rates implicit in asset prices, i.e. such that
the expected present value with these discount rates of future dividends
is today's price. Most people feel they have some idea how variable through
time such discount rates are, and generally they feel discount rates are not
highly variable. For example, most people feel that stock price changes are
due primarily to changing expectations about future dividends rather than
changing rates of discount. It is important to find out if this widespread
feeling is based on some solid evidence. From a personal point of view, big
movements in discount rates actually seem very plausible. in a recession, say,
when output and consumption are some percent below their expected level a
few years hence, it seems plausible that people might not be deterred by very
high real annual rates (10%, 20% or even more) from borrowing to continue
consuming at their usual level. Perhaps they cannot actually borrow at these
rates due to institutional, legal or moral hazard reasons but they can easily
sell their assets, Doesn't it seem plausible that long-term asset prices
might drop 30%, 50% or even more in a deep recession, creating an expectation
of a 10% or 20% return per year over the next few years as the price returns
to a normal level? Selling stock in a recession to consume the proceeds
(thereby foregoing the profit opportunity) is the equivalent of borrowing at
these rates. If this seems plausible, then we might attribute most of the
variability of stock prices to such discount rate changes.
What is meant by the above will be clearer when the theoretical framework
is discussed below, The theoretical framework that I shall use here is simply
that of maximization of an expected utility function of a form that is widely
used in theoretical finance (for example, Merton [1973], Lucas [1978] and Breeden [1979]).—2—
It is the same theoretical framework as that which inspired the model Sanford
Grossman and I used [19811 in a paper on the variability of stock prices, and which
Hall [1981], Hansen and Singleton [1981a], [198lb] and Mankiw [1981] also used to
study the behavior of stock market returns. This framework relates asset returns to
aggregate consumption. Grossman and I suggested that most of the variability of stock
prices might be attributed to information about consumption.
The bulk of this paper will be an exploratory data analysis of the kind advocated
by Tukey [1962] or Simon [1968]. Thus, I will try to try to present in a way useful to
the reader the broadest possible array of evidence relevant to judging the plausibility
of the model. This analysis should be of very general interest, i.e., of interest
from the standpoint of other models as well as the one considered here,. Such
exploratory techniques seem especially appropriate here, since the way to convert
the basic theoretical notion into testable hypotheses about actual data is not at
all well established. I will thus try to portray in what ways the data seem to suggest
that real discount rates move a lot and in what ways the data do not seem to
suggest this, without reaching any final verdict. Thus, we will be interested in
empirical regularities which seem to support or weaken support for the model,
even if they apply only to certain time periods or to certain markets, and
even if the presence or absence of the empirical regularity is not proof or
disproof of the basic theoretical notion. This exploratory data analysis is an
adjunct to a more rigorous and more narrowly focussed study of the theory that
Grossman and I are currently producing.
Three substantive questions which I have distilled from numerous dis-
cussions about the model will be considered here in the course of study of
the model: whether the business cycle behavior of real short—term interest—3—
rates, i.e., real returns on short—term debt, is, inaccordance with the iodel,
whether the model can be eva1uated i,f cQnauption data are not accurate or
are not representative of the consumption of the wealthy minority who hold
stocks, and whether prices of other longterm assets behave in accordance with
the model, i.e.., whether there is an appropriate correlation between price
movements and whether the volatility of stock prices is too high relative to
the -volatility of other long—term assets.
In Section II below, the motivation for our work which emerged from
previous work on the volatility of stock prices is briefly described. In
Section III the model and some of its implications arereviewed. Data on
stock prices as well as short—term interest rates are considered. In Section
IV, tests of the model along lines suggested by Breeden [1979] and pursued
by Hall [1981], Hansen and Singleton [l981a], [1981b] and Mankiw [198lb]
are considered. It is shown to what extent the model can be evaluated
even in the absence of data on consumption of stockholders. In Section V data on land
prices, housing prices and long—term bond prices are considered. A summary of the findings
(but, unfortunately, no definitive conclusion on the merits of the model)
appears in Section VI.
II. Security Price Volatility
Some of my earlier work [1979], [198la], [l981b] suggests that security
prices are far too volatile to be accounted for by new information about
future dividends alone (an analogous claim was made by LeRoy and Porter [1981]).
That is, a model which makes the real price of a share equal to the present
value of expected real dividends discounted by a constant real discount rate—4--
would predict a much smaller variance for changes in price. Stock prices show
enormous volatility. Over the last century the standard deviation of the real
annual return on the Standard and Poor Stock Price Index was about 20 percentage
points. Roughly speaking, in a "typical" year the real value of the stock market
changes 20% one way or the other. What is it that's 20 percent different from
one year to the next that accounts for the price change? One way I used to show
graphically the potential importance of dividends in determining price was to
plot for the last century the perfect foresight or ex—post rational real price
per share P the present value in each year with a constant discount rate
of actual subsequent real Standard and Poor dividends, and of terminal price
at the end of the sample. If actual price P is the present value with the
constant discount rate of the mathematical expectation of dividends and terminal
price then =E(Po),i.e., actual price is the mathematical expectation of
conditional on information available at time t. The real discount rate used
to compute P was taken as the average real Standard and Poor return over the
sample. The P so computed looks very much like a simple trend, and P oscillates
wildly around it. Both P and P computed for the shorter sample period used in
Grossman and Shiller (1981) are shown in figure I. Here P1980 =P01980by
construction, In my paper (l98la) I tried to formalize in what sense the stock
prices were too volatile by showing that the standard deviations of detrended
stock price changes and dividends appear to violate an inequality implied by the
model. Since the detrending is a possible source of problems, I later showed that
the sample standard deviations of differenced stock prices and differenced dividend
series violate an inequality implied by the model (198lb). The volatility inequal—
itiesare more robust to data errors, e.g., small errors in the consumption price
index used to deflate stock prices, than are regression tests of the fore—
castability of real stock returns. Although the use of the volatility inequalities
remain controversial at this date, I do not wish to get into the details of these
inequalities here, nor into the methodological issues raised by such tests, which—5—
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Figure 1 Upper plot: P: Real Standard & Poor Composite Stock Price Index,
Annual Average in 1972 dollars; P: Present value with 6.5% discount rate
of actual subsequent Standard & Poor real dividends and of actual price in
1980; P: Perfect foresight or ex—post rational price assuming coefficient
of relative risk aversion equals 4 where the tax rate assumed is that in the
municipal corporate bond yield spread.
Center plot: P as in upper plot; the perfect foresight price
computed not from actual real dividends but from the exponential trend of
real dividends.
Lower plot: C: Per capita real consumption on nondurables and
services in thousands of 1972 dollars, C: Perfect foresight optimal con—
sulnption for the utility function assuming perfect knowledge of future stock
prices and dividends; C: Perfect foresight optimal consumption assuming
perfect knowledge of future real short term interest rates.—7—
I have recently discussed elsewhere (198lb). I think it is possible to impress on the
reader one basic outcome of this research which should not be controversial. It
* isquite clear from the values of and alone as shown in figure 1 that over
the last century high real stock prices did not tend to be followed by correspond-
ingly high real dividends over the relevant horizon, and low real stock prices
did not tend to be followed by correspondingly low real dividends. Thus, there
is really no evidence in nearly a century of data to support the view that
aggregate stock price movements represent evidence of future real dividend move-
ments. It is still possible that real price is equal to the expected value of
discounted real dividends if stock price movements reflect changing information
about a disaster with low probability (e.g. nationalization) which did not occur
in the sample. I discussed such a model elsewhere (l98lb). The point is, there
is no statistical evidence which would encourage us regarding this model.
I also showed (1981a) that while a model with time yarying real discount rates
could in principle account for the variability of stock market prices, these expected
discount rate movements would (if standard deviations have been correctly measured)
have to be very large. The ca1cularions I made reflect earlier work on the
volatility of long—term interest rates (1979). If real dividends are very stable,
then corporate stock resembles an 'index—consol', and the oneyear return on stock
resembles the one year holding period return on such a bond. If the holding period
return has a standard deviation of about 20 percentage points and this standard
deviation is to be attributed entirely to new information about one—period expected
real interest rate then according to the analysis in thatpaper these expected
one—year real interest rates would have to have a standard deviation of at least
four or five percentage points. This would suggest a minimal plus or minus two
standard deviation range for one—year exptected real interest rates of,say, from
minus five percent to plus fifteen percent, or roughly in therange which
I argued above seems plausible.—8—
III Consumption andUtilityMaximization
Theassumption that individuals choose financial assets so as to maximize
the expected value of an additively separable utility function in consumption
throughout their lives has played an important role in recent literature on
optimal portfolio composition in a dynamic setting (Nertcn [1973], Lucas
[1978], Breeden [1979] and others). The assumption as it will be used here
may also be consistent with Keynesian macroeconomic notions. While Keynes called
his consumption function a "psychological lawn, subsequent literature has in
some cases reinterpreted his theory in terms of utility maximizing behavior (e.g.
Modigliani and Brumberg [1954]) though without the framework of rational expectations.
The assumption here (as in Grossman and Shiller [1981]) is that individuals
choose to invest in freely tradable assets with the objective ofsmoothing their
consumption, i.e. that individuals maximize the expected utility function of the
conventional form:
EU E u(C ) tt t k=O t+k (1
where 5 =1/(1+p) is the subjective discount factor and p is the subjective real
interest rate or rate of impatience, and u(C÷k) is the utility of consumption
at time t+k. The utility function depends on consumption from t to infinity,
although individuals have finite lives. One might interpret the infinite utility func-
tion as a household utility function rather than an individual utility function,and thus that
individuals have the utility of subsequent generations as an argument in their utility.
Individuals may prefer something other than a smooth consumption profile over
their lives, an important consideration with regard to studies of individual life—
cycle saving behavior as in Modigliani and Ando [1963]. Our aggregate consump-
tion data may be regarded as representing the consumption of a representative
household whose average age is unchanging. Kotlikoff and Summers [1980] have
established the importance of intergenerational transfers in saving behavior.
Data on the changing age structure of the population may yet be incorporated into—9—
the analysis infutureresearch, without moving to the no—bequest life—cycle model
which Kotlikoff and Summers criticized.
A first order condition for expected utility maximization is:
P1u'(C) =Et(u'(C+i)(P.t+1+ D1+i)) (2)
where is the ex—dividend real price of the jth freely tradable asset and
Djt+l is the real dividend. This says that the utility lost by forgoing consumption
to buy a share at time t should, at the margin, equal the expected utility to be
gained by selling the share next period and consuming the proceeds. In a world with
income taxes, +1+ D1 should be replaced with the after tax value at time
t+l of the investment in one share made at time t. Dividing both sides of (2) by
P. u'(Ct) and taking this inside the expectation operator (a legitimate operation




+ D.+1)/P. is the return on the asset (if there are taxes,
the after—tax return) and S ='(c+i)1u'(ct)isthe marginal rate of substitution
between consumption at time t and consumption at time t+l. This expression (which
may be regarded as the cornerstone of the consumption beta model of Breeden 119791,
and Rubinstein [1976]), ought to be regarded as a "no profit opportunity" condition
where "profits" are defined as an increase in utility. It thus ought to hold
for all assets and for all individuals, even small investors who hold very little
stock. Because this expression ought to hold for everyone, Breeden showed that we
can aggregate over individuals and derive a relation between returns and aggregate
consumption, and this aggregation will generally be valid even if individuals have
heterogeneous information so long as aggregate S is common information (Grossman
and Shiller [i98l]. (These papers were couched in continuous time and the results
hold only approximately in discrete time.) Since neitherR1 nor S is generally
known at time t, we cannot express E(R1) in terms of E(S). In the case of
a one—period index bond, however, R.t is known at time t and hence for such a bond—10—
Ri =E(S)'.With other assets whose real return is not known in advance, the
covariance at time t between the return and St also influences the expected return.




If one divides expression (2) by u'(Ct) one gets (dropping the j subscript
for brevity) a recursive expression for P:
=
Et((ou'(c+i)/u'(ct)) t+1 + D1)) (5)
Here, u' (Ce) is taken inside the expectations operator, which is a legitimate
operation since C is known at time t. This is a first—order linear rational
expectation model in with a time varying coefficient (i.e. u'(C+1)/u'(C) de-
pends on t). It may be solved by recursive substitution. One merely substitutes
the same expression led one period in place of +1' which yields an expression
in Dt+l D+2 and t+2 Since Et Et+l =Et.
we can dispense with Et+l in the
resulting expression. One then substitutes (5) led two periods in place of
P ,andso on. Under a terminal condition assumption that P does not explode










whichis the fundamental valuation equation in the Grossman—Shiller papers.
Here P is the "perfect foresight price" which would be the price our theory
would predict if both future consumption and future dividends were perfectly known.
This P reduces to the P0 discussed above if people are risk neutral, i.e.
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is zero and u(C) does not depend on
C. Otherwise, P varies with consumption. is the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption at time t and consumption at time t+k. Since, in (6) for-11-
(k)
Stdoes not depend on j,thediscount factors are the same for all securities,
i.e. there is no risk premium in them.-' Since neither nor Dt+k is known at
time t, the expectation operator operates on products of random variables.
Because expectations operators cannot be brought inside nonlinear functions,
price cannot be written as the present value of expected dividends discounted
by a vector of discount rates which is invariant across securities. In particular,
even if a whole term structure of yields on index bonds were available, the price
of stocks whose future real dividends are uncertain would not be the present
value of expected real dividends discounted by these market real interest
rates. Nor is nominal price the present value of nominal dividends discounted
by the nominal interest rates of various horizons implicit in the nominal
term structure of interest rates. Of course, it is always possible to represent
price as the present value of expected dividends discounted by some discount
rate series. One could in fact describe the equation (6) as asserting that price
is the present value of expected dividends discounted by market real interest
rates adjusted for a risk premium that is specific to a particular stock. The
kth term in the summation in (6) for the jth asset can be writtenas:





(k) =coy(ç(k) D /E (D )) —t
'j,t+kt j,t+k—12-
thus, the appropriate risk premium to be applied to the expected marginal
rate or substitution in arriving at the discount factor attime t for
Dj,t+k is the covariance between Sand ,+kpessed as a proportion of its
mean. The simpler expression (6) is, however, probably more useful than (7).
Using some assumption about 6, the function u(C), and a single terminal
* *
valuefor P one can observe historical values of P based on historical
dividend and consumption series. Let us adopt the assumption that u(C) equals
(1—A)/(1—A) where A is the Arrow—Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, so
(k) k A/
that S 6 (Ct/Ct÷k) .Then,for a given A,PAtcanbe computed recursively
* A *
backwards from a terminal value by At =cI(2+1)At+l +Dt+l)
Grossman
and I [1981J plotted this P series for years since 1889 using the Standard
and poor dividend series for D and the U.S. national income accounts/Kuznets real
consumption on nondurables and services per capita for C. We chose, arbitrarily, A=4
and then chose 6 so that (3) held for sample mean. An analogous plot for A=4
appears in figure 1.
Thi:
differs from that in our earlier paper in that it
is an after—tax P .IfP were used in place of P to compute an after—tax return
Rt then RtSt would equal exactly one atall times. The tax rate used to compute
4t was the marginal tax rate implicit in the municipal corporate yieldspread.
The tax rate used was one minus the ratio of the Bond-Buyer municipal Bond yield
average to a corporate bond yield average based on Durand—HOmer and Moody data,
except for a few years at the beginning of the sample when, since the implied
tax rate would be negative, the tax rate was set to zero. The implied tax rate
was generally around 20% to 30% in the postwar period. The nominal capital gains
were assumed taxed at the then current effective long—term captial gains rate for
the marginal income tax rate. For most of the period this works out to half the—13—
the income tax rate,after 1978 at ,4 times the income tax rate, In practice,
the plotted does not look much different from the P computed assuming
no taxes which appears in the Grossman Shiller paper (1981b). The income tax
rates used here were 10% or less until the 1930's and did not reach 20% until
World War II. In the postwar period the Pt in the absence of taxes in nominal
terms is fairly smooth, so no big year to year movements in are induced
by capital gains taxation. The main effect of taxation on P is to cause the P
series to drift down relative to a computed without taxes, so that taxes
cause P to be about 25% lower in the 1950's and early 60's than it would be in
the absence of taxes.
The perfect foresight price P resembles P fairly closely, and, with
this value of A, is about equally volatile i.e. short—run movements were of
about the same magnitude. Note that P with A=4 is much more volatile than
P0with A=0 (the constant real discount rate case), and thus new information
about discount rate movements would seem to serve as a more likely candidate as
a source of stock price movements than new information about dividends.
The motivation for this analysis was to answer the question: if the real value
of the stock market is 20% different from one year to the next, what other variable
is changing enough to cause this change? Apparently, if the value of A4 is
4'
reasonable, consumption has been such a variable.
What is surprising about these series is that there is also a substantial
similarity in the pattern of movements of P and P, at least until the period after
World War II. We would have expected 4t to be much more volatile than P and
not to show a close resemblance to P. The close resemblance suggests that there
is a sense in which a perfect foresight model has some explanatory power.
This similarity arises almost entirely due to the behavior of the consumptLon-i4
related discount rate rather than the behavior of dividends. To highlight this
fact, we also computed P using, not the actual dividend series but in place of
actual dividends a long—run exponential trend fitted to the dividend series. This
series computed for A=4 and denoted P is shown in figure 1 middle panel.
It appears virtually identical to the P computed from the actual dividend
series, and thus we say that it is consumption and not dividends which accounts
*
forthe co—movement of P and P
t 4t
We might elaborate on the similarity between P and P before the recent
period. The 1891—2 market rally and 1892—94 market collapse are matched by
*
correspondingmovements in P ,the1899 market peak is matched by a peak in
*
P4
The sharply rising market between 1900 and 1901 is matched by a corresponding
* *
risein P4. The 1906 market peak is also a peak in P4, as is the 1909 peak. The
1916—17 drop in the market is matched by a drop in P. In the period of the 2OTs
the short run movements do not match a1though the trend in both series is upward)
and the P4 series shows an anomolous drop from 1924 to 1925 caused by a movement
in the real consumption series. The 1925 drop in real consumption does not
correspond to a decline as measured by the NBER reference dates, which made
September 1924 a trough and October 1926 a peak. The drop is not in evidence
in other measures of aggregate economic activity, such as industrial production
or unemployment, and thus, may reflect an error in the Kuznets data. Both
P and P reach the major peak in 1929 and drop very dramtically, although they
do not bottom out quite together. The next major peak in P is 1936, (and P is
*
fairlylevel into 1937) while P peaks in 1937, then both drop onto the recession
of 1938. Here, while P4 cOrresponds to P in overall pattern the amplitude
of the movement in P is smaller than that of P, a harbinger of the relatively
*
stablebehavior of P in subsequent years. The 1946 market peak is matched-15-
pretty well by a peak in P4.
The period since the early 1950vs does not seem to reveal much similarity
between P and P4. One is struck by the dramatic hump shapein P and u shape
for P4.There are still some similarities in the short run movements. The
first major postwar market peak, in 1956, is matched by a faint peak in P4
in the same year. The 1959 market peak is also matched by a faint peak in
* *
P4.
However, the 1961, 65, 68, and 76 market peaks show no counterpart in P
The only recent stock price movement which is predicted by P is the dramatic
market drop from 1973 to 1974, however the actual market drop is 12 times
larger than the drop in P.
An impressionistic description such as this of the resemblance between
two series may sometimes see spurious patterns in the data. Some simple check
of the significance of the correlation is in order. A simple measure of the short—
run correspondence of the two series is the squared coherence between the
series which is a sort of R2 between the series as a function of frequency. The
coherence was computed for the period 1889 to 1950 using periodogram averaging
(computed without padding series with zeros) with a wrap—triangular filter of
width 12 using the TROLL CROSPECT package. The coherence squared between P4
and P (both detrended) was above .47, the critical coherence squared at the
five percent level, in the range of four to seven years and peaked at .74 for
cycles of length six years. The same coherence pattern is found between
C and P. since P4 is basically just a filtered version of C. If the entire
sample is used from 1889 to 1980, the coherence is not significant anywhere.
A resemblance between and P may not seem altogether surprising, since
is a funcion of aggregate consumption and since a correlation between the
stock market and aggregate economic activity has long been part of the
conventional wisdom. However, the resemblance between P and P is much stronger
than the resemblance between P and C. In order to make this clear, the—16--
aggregate consumption per capita on nondurables and services is plotted in
figure 1 below the price series. The resemblance between C and is indeed far
less obvious. The series looks like a detrended version of C which has
been multiplied by a scale factor which makes its fluctuations as a percent of
P look A times bigger than the fluctuations in C as a percent of C. Linearizing
(6) around C =CH1
=Cand Dt =Dt+l
= = Dand assuming 0 << 1,we
find that in the absence of taxes:
*- AD k ACt+k +kDt+k
(8)
(l—5) C k=1 k=l
So that P is approximately a moving average with exponentially declining weights
of future A C plus a moving average with exponentially declining weights of future
*
D.The gain from C to P is given by:
ADS r2—2cos (w) 0.5
g(w) -r<w<i (9)
(l—S) C(1+52) —2cos (w)




For 5 very close to one, the gain is approximately constant and the phase is
approximately zero for all frequencies except those very close to the zero
frequency (the trend) where gain is approximately zero and the phase approximately
-
Thephase angle function does not suggest anything like the conventional
notion that stock prices tend to lead measures of aggregate economic activity by
a few months to a year.'Such a notion could be represented by a phase
angle function which is a straight line from the origin with a positive
slope, while the phase angle (10) is negative and does not pass through the
origin. Therefore, the phase angle implies that stock prices slightly lag—1 7
behind consumption i.e. that stock prices tend to peak slightly later than
7/
consumption prices.If the component of consumption at w is considered, then
near the peak of the sine waves one can find a unit interval over which the change
in the component is zero. Over this interval, return timesmust be unitary.
Since price is high, the dividend price ratio is low which must be compensated by
an increasing stock price.
The same resemblance between P and P can also be represented in another
way. We can compute, at least up to a constant of proportionality, what consump-
tion would be if people knew future returns with certainty, and if stocks were
the only asset. Then, the marginal rate of substitution between Cr11 and C times
the after—tax return between t and t+k would equal one exactly. This will be
satisfied by perfect foresight consumption C if:
* T-l
-1/A
CAt =CT R.) (11)
thus, if we computed CAfor t0 toT and substituted the resulting series in place
of C in (6), then the P computed would equal P .Conversely,if after—tax
returns computed from A rather than P were substituted into (11) then the CA corn—
* -A
puted would equal C. The CAWe have defined has the property C =Et(CAt
)as
can be verified from (3) by recursive substitution using the fact that Rt and
.8/
Ct+l are known at time t.This propertyis analogous to that of P1 =
TheC computed from the after—tax real return on the stock market appears in
figure 1, bottom panel, along with actual real per capita consumption C. The
same A that was used to compute P4 was used to compute C, and soin
effect C4 is anattenuatedP plus trend while C is an attenuated P4 plus trend.
Thus, the same short—run correspondence that was noted above between P and appears
between C and C, although the correspondence is harder to see since the movements
are less conspicuous relative to trend and the trend is strong enough to cancel
out some downturns observed in P and P. Thethat was needed to keep C with the
same trend as C with this A was substantially greater than one (S=l.02) and even with this—18—
,C4and C show some low frequency divergence; only shorter—run movements correspond.
The similarity between C and C shows that to a substantial extent
people behaved as if they knew all future stock returns and were optimizing
their consumption given that information. This ought to seem quite remarkable to
someone who thought that movements in the stock market make no sense. It would
have seemed far more likely that individuals behaved as if they knew all future
-A shortt:rm real interest rates with certainty. Recall however that C E(C
where C is computed using the return on any asset. If CA is computed using the
one—year real after—tax return on prime commercial paper in place of the real
return on stock (also shown in figure 1 for A=4, denoted C1) one finds that
there is little resemblance between this C1 and C. C1 is snoother than actual
consumption arid thus we Cannot justify the magnitude of actual year to year fluc-
tuations without a much larger coefficient of relative risk aversion A. A much
larger A would not, however, make C resemble actual consumption since the
short—run movements in C1 do not correspond to movements in actual consumption.
The overall amplitude of movements inC1 is nearly as large as that of C re-
flecting the strong low—frequency component to real short—term interest rates.
Again, however, the low frequency movements of C do not correspond to those of C.—19—
IV Evaluating the Model UsingReturns_DataAlone
Themodel described above, and summarized in expression (6), is a
relationship among three stochastic processes: price per share F, dividend
per share D and consumption C. One may wish to base testing of the model
on only two stochastic processes: the return per share (which is a trans-
formation of the two stochastic processes price and dividend) R and consump-
tion C. Or one may wish to test using returns R alone.
One may wish to test the model using returns and consumption data tlone
just because the likelihood function may be written in a simple form for
these data. Since (6) involves expectations of sums of products, no simple
distributional assumptions for D and C yi1d a simple joint distribution
for P, D and C. For example, if D and C are both log normal processes,
then the marginal distribution for P is a transcendental function. It is
convenient, however, to write a joint lognormal distribution for R and C,
although in so doing we lose the information in the separate P and D series,
i.e., we loseinformation that was apparent in the plots of P and:P4.
As was noted in Grossman and Shiller (1981), with a lognormal assumption
and two or more assets the two parameters A and 6 are identified even if it
is assumed that no information is available that is relevant to the con-
ditional expectation. On the other hand, if other information variables
are available, the parameters may be identified using data for returns on only
one asset. Grossman and I have been working on estimation of A and 6
using such methods.
Hall (1981), Hansen and Singleton (198la)(1981b), and Mankiw (l981b) have
also estimated A and 6 using similar methods. Hall found, as did Grossman and
It, that postwar data suggest implausibly high estimates of A. Hansen and Singleton,
on the other hand, found values of A in the vicinity of one using a monthly
series of recent consumption. Mankiw claimed to ieject the model, as did Hansen—20—
and Singleton for tests involving more than one asset with their monthly data,
on the basis that returns and consumption were forecastable in a way incon-
sistent with the model, i.e., that, in effect, RtSt is forecastable. We can
interpret the negative evidence provided by Mankiw and Hansen and Singleton in
a number of ways without rejecting the basic theoretical model. It could be that
the consumption data are inaccurate. If the reported consumption is a moving
average, say, of actual consumption, consumption will have a spurious forecastability.
It could be that the information set they assumed is bigger than that actually used
monthly by consumers. It is costly for ordinary individuals to process information
on a monthly basis, and thus it seems a priori unlikely that they would do as
well as a vector autoregression in forecasting. Hail (1981) made a similar point
when he claimed that the expected stock market returns by his vector autoregres-
sive model were too variable to be plausible as expectations, and so he considered
a Bayesian alternative to the vector autoregressive model which biases
expected returns to the mean. Moreover, it could be that the model held for
earlier years even if it has broken down for recent years.
The problem with consumption data seems particularly troublesome. The
potential problems are bigger than those suggested just by datacollection errors
and interpolation of some components. There are real conceptual problems in
national income accounting. Which expenditures qualify as consumption?Which
as some form of investment? It has been suggested thatvacations are really
consumer durables which last a year or longer, in the formof memories. Moreover,
although the expression (3) should in principle hold for all peopleand thus,
as shown inBreeden (1979) and Grossman and Shiller (198la),for aggregate consumption,
it may be that only a small percent of the population actually investsin stocks,
prhaps due to the fixed cost of acquiring information. Aggregate consumption may—21-
thus be a poor proxy for the consumption of the generally wealthy minority who
hold stocks. It may be influenced substantially be the behavior of a liquidity
constrained segment of the population, as argued by Mishkin [1977]. It is worth-
while then to consider testing the model in a manner which is robust to errors
in consumption data.
Suppose we do not use data on S. What restrictions on the stochastic
properties of returns are implied by (3)? One easily sees that the relation
implies that there are no riskless arbitrage opportunities. Any asset
(or portfolio of assets) whose return R is known with certainty must, by (3),
have return Rt =1/E(S).It is therefore impossible to earn a sure positive
return on a portfolio whose total price is zero.
What, however, does the theory imply about risky profit opportunities?
Suppose we have a random vector Z whose th element is the return on the1th
asset and for which Var(Z) is nonsingular. Lacking any information at
all on the behavior of S, the basic first—order condition (3) implies no
restrictions whatsoever on the mean or variance of Z.
The restrictions implied by the conventional mean—variance capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) are not implied by the model. The CAPM asserts, for example,
that any two assets with the same market portfolio covariance will have the same
expected return. These two assets, however, may have different covariances
with consumption, and it is covariance with consumption that matters. Given
this theory, the only way it would make any sense to suppose that the CAPM ought
to hold even approximately would be if we had iiformation that the market return
was a proxy for consumption.2"—22—
The theory does not imply a one—factor model for returns, such as that
considered by Ross [1976]. A one—factor model as it is used by psychologists
and other social scientists, would assert that Var(Z) =LL'+ D where L is
a vector and D a diagonal matrix. The essence of such a model is that for
each element of the vector the variation not explained by the common factor
is entirely specific to the element. We might take consumption as a common factor,
but there is nothing in the theory which would suggest that there are not also
other common factors which influence returns. There is no reason why there shouldn't
also be industry factors, e.g. all railroad stocks tend to rise and fall together.
Nor is there any implications from the theory that the first principal component
accounts for a large part of the variance of returns, or that a spectral factor
analytic model (Sargent and Sims(1977)) obtains.
The reason that there are no restrictions on the mean or variance of
is easily seen. The expression (3) implies a restriction on the mean of each
element of Z but the restriction involvesan unknown parameter, COV (SR.t )which
is specific to each element. In the absence of information about S this un-
known parameter could be anything. It is true, of course, that positive de-
finiteness imposes some restrictions across elements of a variance matrix.
Positive definiteness can be described as requiring that all principal minors of
Var(SZ) are strictly positive. Such restrictions are inequalityrestrictions.
It is easily seen from the definition that all principal minors which involve
Cov(S R. )forany i also involve Var(S), and that this term multiplies by
t it
another principal minor which is strictly positive. If we do not know the
variance of S, then the inequalities are of no help whatsoever because they
all involve an arbitrarily large positive unknown element. The reason why we
were able to find testable implications for the case where some assets were
perfectly correlated is that in that case some principal minors of Var(S, Z)
involve COV (R. ,S )butdo not involve Var(S )andthus constitute usable
it t t
restrictions, i.e. the ttno riskiess arbitrage" restrictions.—23—
Hansen and Singleton (1981) have perfoited an interesting test
of the model in the absence of both conumption and price index data. They
noted that under the assumption that the logs of returns, prices and consumption
follow a vector autoregression with the usual homoskedastic residuals, the
difference between the log nominal return of the 1th asset and the log nominal
return of the 1th asset is unforecastable. Thus, their maintained hypothesis
embodies the assumption that expected returns change through time in an observable
way but expected covariances do riot. The fact that they were able to forecast
these excess returns might mean that the theoretical model is wrong, or that
the covariance matrix of residuals changes through time.
The problem we face, of course, is not that we have no information about
S but instead that we have limited information about St. We observe a consumption
series which may be inaccurate but we have some idea about how actual consumption
behaves from the data. If we really want to form an opinion regarding the
value of the model we want to use what prior information we have. It may be
that the model can be made consistent with the data only if a(S) is implausibly
large. We can derive inequality restrictions on cr(S) in terms of stochastic proper—
ties of observable variables, and compare these iestrictions with our priors on
or(S). Pnother way of describing this approach is that even where no riskLess arbitrage
opportunities exist there ought to be some way of ascertaining wheher "approximate
arbitrage" profit opportunities exist. We have no way of deciding whether a profit
opportunity is approximately an arbitrage opportunity until we have some way of
claiming that certain discrepancies are implausibly large.
One way of putting a lower bound on a (S), in effect, was already noted
above which appears in my earlier paper (1981). Using data on dividends and
stock prices and using a linearization of the present value relation (6) in
terms of dividends and discount rates, I was able to put a lower bound on the
standard deviation of the expected real interest rate or marginal rate of substitution
in terms of the standard deviation of dividends and the standard deviation of—24--
prices.
It is also possible to arrive at a lower bound on the standard deviation
of the marginal rate of substitution without the linearization and using
data on asset returns alone, From expression (4) and the definition of the correla-
tion coefficient we have for the th asset:
E(R. )= E(S)1(l- o(R)o(S)) (12)
where is the correlation coefficient between the return on the th asset and the
marginal rate of substitution. Using this expression for the 1th and th assets,
solving for 0(S) and using the fact that correlation coefficients are between





This inequality puts a lower bound on the standard deviation of S in terms only
of the means and standard deviations. The inequality holds for E(R.) >E(R.)when
=—land p. =+1.A stronger inequality can be derived which makes use of the
covariance between R. and R., but this inequality is simpler. This inequality asserts
that if two assets have very different average returns and their standard deviations
are not sufficiently large, then a(S) must be large if the covariance with S is to
explain the difference in average returns. If one uses the Standard and Poor portfolio
as the asset, and prime 4—6 month commercial paper as the1th asset, and sample
means and standard deviations of after—tax real one year returns for1891 to 1980
in the right hand side of the above inequality, then the lower bound on a(S) is
0.20. Thus, a four standard deviation range for the one year marginal rate of
substituion might be from .6 to 1.4. The large standard deviation for S
arises because of the large difference between the after tax average real
returns on stocks,(E(r.) =1.057or a rate of return of 5.7% per year for 1891
to 1980) and average after—tax real return on commercial paper (E(R)1.0l4 or—25—
a rate of return o 1.4% per year for 1891 to 1980) while the standard deviations
or the real after—tax returns are not sufficiently high (.154 for stocks and
.059 for commercial paper) to account for the average return spread unless a()
is very high. A high a(s.) suggest a high coefficient of relative risk aversion
A, since a(s) A o(C/C). For 1891 to 1980 a( ZC/C) was .035, so a lower bound
for a(s) of .20 suggestsA be over five.
Of course, expected returns and standard deviation of returns are not
precisely measured, even in a hundred years of data. An asymptotic standard
error for the estimate of the right hand side of t1e inequality (12) made by
substituting sample means and sample standard deviations into the expression,
assuming the covariance between (R.) and (R.) equals zero, was .078. Thus
the estimated lower bound for a (5) is only two and a half standard deviations
from zero. Moreover, the asymptotic standard error may not well measure the
true standard error in small samples if data are distinctly nonnormal. On
the other hand, further research along these lines might put a tighter lower
bound on a(S) using a stronger inequality that makes use of the observed covariance
between R1 and R., or using data onmore than two assets or using additional in-
formationvariables. Even without doing this, however, we see thaZ the conventional
notionthat stocks have a much higher return than does short debt epupled wjth
the notionthat pre—tax stock real returns have a standard deviation in the vicinity
of 20percent per year, commercial paper much less, implies that the standard de-
viation of S is very high.—26—
V An Exploratory Look at DataonOther Asset Prices
The notion that corporate stock price movements are primarily due to
large real discount rate movements suggests that there ought to be other assets
whose price movements closely match those of stocks. If there is any asset
whose real "dividend" follows a growth path, then its ex—post rational price
will be proportional to the P** shown in figure 1. Moreover, any asset whose
real dividend shows noisy movements around a trend which are of the same order
of magnitude as the movements of real dividends of corporate stock around their
trend ought to have an ex post rational price which closely resembles the
shown in figure 1, since as was noted above,the P for corporate stocks shown
in figure 1 closely resembles P* .Ifan asset exists whose P* resembles that
of corporate stocks, then we would expect its price should closely resemble
that of corporate stocks, since I' E(P). The problem we face, however, is
that of finding such alternative assets. The nonexistence of index bonds or close
substitutes for such assets has long been lamented. In this section, I will
review the most obvious candidates for such alternatives, and discuss the adequacy
of the data.
Price of Land A measure of the price of land can be found in the land value
series in the year end outstanding table for National Net Worth (Consolidated Dom-
estic Net Assets at Current Cost) of the Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy
provided by the Flow of Funds Section at the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Since, in contrast to other assets, the quantity of land is
fixed a total value series serves also as a price index. The real series (i.e. the
series divided by the consumption deflator used in the preceding analysis) is
plotted in figure 1 as series L,FRB The series may give a rough indication of
the price of land. Unfortunately, land and structures are not generally marketed40
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Figure 2: Real prices of corporate tock, land, housing, and long—term bonds.
All series are divided by the consumption deflator for nondurables and services
(1972 =1.0).Upper panel: P, Standard & Poor Composite Stock Price Index.
Second panel: L,FRB' Federal Reserve Board Land Value series from the Balance
Sheets for the U.S. Economy, year and outstandings, National Net Worth, in ten
billions of dollars; L,USDA' the USDA index number of average value of farm
real estate per acre 1967 =100;third panel: P ,Grebler—Blank—Winnick
H, Grebler
price index for one—family owner occupied houses 1929 =100;H, Fisher' Fisher's
median asking price for existing one—family houses, Washington, D.C. in hundreds
of dollars; ,cr' home purchase component of consumer price index for all urban
consumers, 1967 =100;H,Census Census Bureau price index of new
one family houses sold, 1972 =100(The scale for P and P is at
H,CPI H,Census
right);bottom panel: B, Price of a 5% 25 year bond whose yield is the Nacaulay
Railroad Bond Yield Arithmetic index (1890—1935) and Moody Aaa Corporate Bond
Yield Average (1936—80).separately, so the price is mostly fictitious. Every five years the censuses
of governments provide estimates of total market value of real estate based on
assessed value and a sample of sales during the census year. This value includes
both structures and land. For these years the nonagricultural component of the
Federal Reserve land value series is based on the total value of real estate
minus the Commerce Department estimate of the total value of structures, i.e.
Fixed Nonresidential Business and Residential Properties. The Commerce Department
figure is computed on a perpetual inventory method based on data on investment in
structures, an assumed depreciation rate, and current sales price data. The
Federal Reserve estimates land values for intercensus years based on an interpolated
ratio of land value to structures value in census years, and on the value of
structures series. While the Federal Reserve Series may be the best we will ever
have for total land value, no such perpetual inventory method can accurately
capture the current market value of structures. Thus, the Federal Reserve total
land value series is useful only as a rough indication of actual land values.
Perhaps there are fewer problems in measuring the price of agricultural land.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture publishes an index of average value of farm real
estate per acre, in a series which extends back to 1912. The series divided by
the price index is plotted in figure 2 as series L,USDA While this index is
the price per acre of farms rather than of farm land, the structure component
of farm value is likely to be less variable than is the structure component
of aggregate national real estate value. The series is based on reports from
the regular crop reporters, who are asked to estimate the prevailing market value of
farmland in their area (USDA, (l970')).Lt is reasonable to suppose that the reporters—30—
base their estimates on recent actual sale prices. Since the reporters are
asked to exclude from consideration any land in other than agricultural
uses, but include land whose price may be affected by the prospect of other
uses the series suffers from a sort of data truncation problem. The total amplitude
of the variation in real agricultural land prices is on the same order of
magnitude as that of stock prices. Thus, for example, with the data shown in figure
1, the ratio of the highest real value to the lowest real value in years since
1945 was 3.1 for agricultural land, and 4.2 for corporate stocks, while for
the years before 1945 the corresponding numbers were 2.00 for land and 3.9 for
stocks. The standard deviation of the annual percentage change in the real price Of land.
was 8 percentage points in contrast to a standard deviation of percentage change
in real stock prices of 17 percentage points over the same sample period. Land
prices, in contrast to stock prices are serially correlated. The correlationfrom
1913 to 1980 of the percentage change in real agricultural land prices with the
lagged percentage change was .44, which was significant at the .001 level. The
serial correlation of price change is not prima facie evidence that returns are ser-
ially correlated, since we do not have data on land rents, however it suggeststhat
the land price series may be artificially smoothed.
Prices of Housiiig A number of housing price series are available. I shall
discuss here only those which relate to prices of finished homes rather than
the construction cost indices. The most widely cited series are the average or
median price of new homes. A monthly series (beginning in 1963) produced by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appears on the back page of the Wall Street
Journal on Mondays. This series is just the average price of a sample of new
homes financed by conventional mortgages. The Bureau of the Census also publishes
(in Construction Review )anaverage sale price of new homes sold based on a sample
which is not confined to homes sold with conventional mortgages. Anotherseries by—31-
the National Association of Realtors, which begins in 1966, gives the median
sales price of existing single family homes.
None of the above series controls for quality changes in housing sold. Two
recent series are available, however, which do make a correction for quality
changes. The first is the Census Bureau's price index of new one—family houses sold
which measures the sale price of houses which are the same with respect to ten im-
portant physical characteristics as the houses sold in the base weighting period
1974. This series which is plotted in real terms (i.e. divided by the consumption
deflator in figure 2 and denoted as H,CENSUS goes back only to 1963. Another
series which purports to measure roughly the same thing is the home purchase com-
ponent of the Consumer Price Index. This series which is plotted in real terms,
denoted H,CPI in figure 2,is intended to represent the price of both new and
existing homes which are the same with respect to two characteristics; age arid
square footage of living space. The series does not reflect costs of financing,
taxes and insurance or maintenance and repairs, which are separate components of
the Consumer Price Index. Unfortunately, the annual average real series, when
converted to real terms, bears virtually no resemblance to the annual average
real Census Bureau series. Notably, H,CpI declines 3% from 1963 to 1973 while
the P series rises by 10% over the same period. Moreover, H
CPIrises
H, CENSUS
only 4% from 1973 to 1978, while H,CENSUS rises by 20%. This could be a reflec-
tion of actual relative price changes between the new and existing homes in the
CPI sample and the new homes in the Census sample. John S. Greenlees (1981) has
shown, however, that when a methodology is used which is closer to that of the
Census Bureau to extract an index from the CPI data, theresulting index is
much closer to the Census index. Over the 1973—8 period which hestudied, he
resolved the discrepancy between the growth rates. He attributed a largepart of
the difference to the fact that the CPI series is derived only from dataon
homes sold with FHA mortages, and FHA inortages are subject to acomparatively low
ceiling on principal, a ceiling which is revised from time to time. For example,
the ceiling was raised from $33,000 to $45,000 in 1974, then from $45,000 to—32—
60,000 in 1978. Since mortgage value is closely related to sale price, the
CPI data suffer a severe truncation problem which is dealt with only by
"linking" out the ceiling change dates.
One prewar housing price series also exists which in effect attempts to
control for quality. This series, plotted in real terms in figure 2 as H, GREBLER'
constructed by Leo Grebbler, David Blank and Louis Winnick (1956),is derived
from data collected in the Financial Survey of Urban Housing conducted by
the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1934, which covered 22 cities widely scattered
geographically. Each owner of a one—family owner—occupied house was asked the
value of his house in 1934 and the year and price of acquisitionThe index
isbased on the median for each year for the homes acquired in that year
of the ratio of price of acquisiton to the 1934 price. This median is converted
to an index after correcting for a trend rate of depreciation net of improvements.
If the trend is correct, then this series should accurately represent the price of
a home of constant quality. To the extent that thete are systematic intertemporal
variations in the aggregate resources expended to maintain and improve homes,
the year to year fluctuations in price will also be misrepresented. Other sources
of error in the series may come from homeowner misreporting of data. One
suggestion that such errors may be important is the tendency observed by the
authors for respondents to report acquisition years (for the earlier years)
which are multiples of 5. A more important source of error may be the failure to
accurately report the 1934 price. Home owners who did not sell in that year may have
only vague impressions as to the current market price of their homes. The
authors argued that this causes no bias in the index for years other than 1934
unless "the degree of underestimate or overestimate of value in 1934 were correlated
with length of holding." There is reason to suspect however, that the error is
correlated with length of holding. If homeowners bias their estimates toward-33-
the acquisition price, the nominal home price series will be less variable
than it should be, and the real price biased in the direction of the reciprocal
of the price index.
Some idea of the importance of these problems can be obtained by looking
at another index of housing prices which, while not quality controlled at all,
does overlap with the HGREBLERseries. This series, constructed by Ernest
Fisher (1951) plotted in real terms as H,
FISHER,
is just the median asking
price of existing one family homes in Washington, D.C. as advertised in newspapers.
The series does not closely resemble the P
GREBLERseries, but the overall pattern
is similar enough to suggest some confidence in the series. For example, one is led
to suppose that real housing prices did not fall in the Depression as did real
stock prices However, with real estate, asking prices may in depressions be
upward biased measures of market prices. According to Hoyt (1933 ,p.402),
at this time, "normal sales of real estate have ceased. There is a considerable
number of 'transfers,' but these are mostly conveyances to relatives to avoid
11/
judgments," etc.
The recent housing price indexes look much different from the old, in that
the new price series are much smoother. The standard deviation of the annual
percentage change in the real Census housing price index is only 2.3 percentage points,
compared with 8.2 percentage points in the Grebler Series.
Another possible error in all series might arise since sales contracts
may involve more than just transfer of the house, so that the price reflects
such other factors. Assumable long—term mortgages may be transferred along with
the house. The value of such inortgagesdepends on the level of interest rates.
Owners may sometimes finance the sale themselves at nonmarket rates thus in
effect subsidizing the purchase of their home. Prices of houses sold at fore-
closure may be bid up to the full amount of the mortgage by the mortgagee to prevent-34-
other creditors of the defaulting owner to secure the propertyfor a smaller
amount (Hoyt (1933)).
Prices of Long—Term Bonds A bond price series is much easier tofind and likely
to be more reliable than the land price or housing priceseries. To construct
this series, a bond yield average was constructed by joining the Nacaulay January
railroad bond yield arithmetic index 1890 to 1935 (Macaulay [1937])to Moody's Aaa
Corporate bond yield average for the second trading dayof the year for 1936. to
1980. These were yields to maturity on long—term bonds. The averagetime to
maturity in the Moody series ranged from 20 to 35 years. Abond price series was
taken as the price of a 25 year 5% bond with this yield, and is plotted inreal
terms in figure 2, bottom panel. The real dividend for this seriesis of course,
proportional to the inverse of the price level. Thus, the realdividend behaved
as a more or less steady downtrend except for the years 1920 to.1933. An cx post
rational real bond price with a constant discount rate (i.e. a P) was computed
with the discount rate equal to average real return on bonds. Since the averagereal
return on bonds was so low, only 1.3%, the moving average was extremely long and thus
*
P0was virtually a steady downward trend.
Comparison of Stock with the Other Price Series. A comparison of th e four major
asset prices: stock prices,, land prices, housing prices and bond prices, shown
in figure 2 shows no striking similarities at any frequency in the deviations
of the series from their long—term trends. We have seen that there areserious
problems with the land and housing price series, and one mightattribute
the lack of similarity to the data errors. The data problems are perhaps
unlikely to be responsible for such things as the failure of landand housing
prices to fall in the stock market crash of 1929 to 1932, or in the recent
stock market crash of 1968 to 1978. The recent discrepancy between stock prices
and housing prices has been attributed to tax effects (Peldstein (1980a),(1980b),
Summers (198C))however this particular explanation cannot plausibly account for
discrepancies in the pre World War II period. One might also attribute the dis-
crepancies to divergence in the unobserved "dividend" series for land and housing.—35—
For housing, which is a reproducible asset, one might have reason to suspect that
the effective dividend was systematically related to the discount rate. In an
extreme case where an asset is instantaneously producible and consumable its
price should always be constant in terms of consumption. However, housing is
hardly instantaneously producible and consumable, and so one would expect that
its real price should have fallen in times of sudden economic distress, such as
the Great Depression. Perhaps the data are at fault for this period.
The standard deviation of the annual percentage changes of real price in
the land and the earlier housing series was a little over half the standard de-
viation of the percentage change in the real stock price series. The standard
deviation of the percentage change of the more recent hedonic housing price indexes
in real terms was much lower. These differences in standard deviations are not
what one would have expected if one assumes that the 'dividends" of land and
housing were as trendy as the dividends of stock. The data on long—term lipnds,
also show a lower percentage real price change from year to year. The standard
deviation of a real annual long—term bond return series from 1890 to l98G Is between
a third and a half of that on stocks real returns. Since the real dividend on
bonds shows a marked downtrend, in contrast to the uptrend in corporate stock real
dividends, long—term bonds are in effect a much shorter—term asset than stocks.
One might conceivably attribute the smaller stnadard deviation of real returns on
bodns relative to stocks to their shorter duration.—36--
VI Summary and Conclusion
I sought in this paper to explore a number of alternative avenues to judging
whether there is an element of truth to the notion that large variations in real
discount rates are responsible for asset price fluctuations. Some evidence
was found which seems encouraging, some of it not so encouraging, none of it
clearly decisive.
The most encouraging piece of evidence remains the fact, already noted in my
paper with Grossman, that until recently actual stock prices resembled ex—post
rational stock prices defined in accordance with the model. The ex-post rational
stock price was redone here to take account of taxation but this had no important
effect on the conclusion. The same resemblance was also presented here in another
way: an ex—post rational consumption was computed which is the utility maximizing
consumption given perfect foresight about future stock returns. While the ex—post
rational consumption showed some long—term drift relative to actual consumption
there were (until recently) a number of corresponding short —term movements in
the series. Cross spectral analysis confirmed that, for the period before world
War II, there was significant coherence between these short -term movements. Thus,
people in fact behaved to some extent as if they knew future stock market returns
and were optimizing their consumption pattern. This is not as implausible as
it at first seems, nor does it directly imply a counterf actual behavior of short—
term real interest rates. Consumption has, in the past.varied a great deal, i.e.
sometimes people are apparently substantially worse off than at other times. What
is it, other than a substantial expected profit opportunity, which would entice the
representative man to hold the existing shares in times of economic distress?
Consider, for concreteness, the year 1932. In that year, real aggregate con—
suuptionon nondurables and services per capita was 18% below the value in 1929.
One can try to imagine what it must have been like to suffer such a decline in
consumption. The total number of shares per capita outstanding in 1932 was—37—
not much different than it was in 1929, and yet people must have perceived
themselves as much worse off in 1932. The price per share must have fallen
until the representative man is enticed by the profit opportunity to hold the
same number of shares in 1932 as he did in 1929 (disregarding the changes in
numbers of shares or in population between 1929 and 1932). Imagine how you might
try to justify to your spouse the idea of investing in the stock market in 1932
when the family can't afford ordinary amenities in life which they have grown
accustomed to. Would a 20% expected return in one year be enough? Perhaps it
would take a 50% expected return in one year before actually holding the same
amount of stock as in 1929 would seem like a good idea for the family. These
are enormous one—year expected rates of return, but are they implausible? This
example is chosen to illustrate the plausibility of large movements in expected
return. It should not be inferred that the theory requires that expected one year
real interest rates, i.e.,expected real returns on short debt,were high in 1932.
The low stock market in 1932 in the face of relatively constant dividends is
consistent with any pattern of short—term real interest rate, so long as the long—
term real interest rate is high, which in our theory means that the long—run
outlook for consumption is upward. What is it reasonable to suppose people actually
expected? If we imagine that people use history to make such judgments, then it
would seem quite reasonable that they expected the depression to end. The major
depressions they remembered —thoseof the 1870's and 1890's —didcome to end
after a few years. The fact that P resembles P in Figure I suggests that
people had some way of knowing the future path of consumption.
Whatis not encouraging about the evidence presented in this paper is that
ifanex—post rational consumption series is computed using real short—term
interestrates rather than using stock returns then we see really no resemblance—38—
with actual consumption. This ex—post rational consuption series is really just
a transformation of an ex—post long—term real rate of return computed from short—
term interest rates. Thus, by comparing this perfect foresight consumption
with actual consumption we are doing the right thing to ascertain whether short—
term interest rates behave in accordance with the perfect foresight model, in
contrast to the wrong inferences about short—term interest rates just warned against
above. It would have been inspiring for us if this perfect foresight consumption
resembled actual consumption at least at some frequencies. Failing that, one must
trytodecide whether doing data analysis of a model incorporating uncertainty
about future real short—term interest rates could be more inspiring. Possibly
other considerations are relevant. Individuals cannot borrow at the commercial
paper rate, and because of enforcement problems, short—term credit maybe available
only to persons whose consumption is much higher than is suggested by aggregate
data. Credit rationing might prevent actual observed interest rates from rising.
Other institutional factors or "moneyness" might be responsible for the failure
of commercial paper rates to move in such a way as to look encouraging for the
model here.
I regard it as somewhat encouraging for the model that, as shown in Section
IV,theobserved difference between average stock returns and average short—term
interest rates suggests the same large movements in marginal rates of substi-
tution hichmight account for large stock price movements. On the other hand,
the failure of land, housing or bond prices to move with stock pdces is discouraging.
Such evidence is hardly convincing, since there are so many problems with the
data, Moreover, we lack data on the "dividends" for land and housing. There may be.
other reasons to question the applicability of the model to these series, due
to the very large transactions costs to trading in them, the lumpiness of the
assets, or even special attitudes to farm and home.—39--
Rational expectations models are, of course, best viewed as only a first
step or exploratory modelwhjch might ultimately suggest more accurate models.
Obviously everyone isn't forecasting optimally, and it has been established by
experimental, psychologists that people in fact systematically violate the axioms
of Von Neumann—Morgenstern utility. It is to be expected then, that any rational
expectations model will be contradicted in some dimensions even if it appears
promising in others.
I am not prepared to advance any well defined psychological model of asset
pricing. I do feel that it is conceivable that this might be done in such a way
as to preserve the basic notion that stock prices fall in recessions because of
consumption smoothing behavior, even if land, housing, short—term or long—term debt
do not behave in accordance with the model. Perhaps the very ambiguity in funda-
mental value which characterizes corporate stocks causes people to regard stock
as a psychologically different saving medium, one for which large expected returns
ar e less enticing and which seem more dispensable in a recession.Such divergent
behavior between stocks and bonds or other assets might suggest a "profit oppor-
tunity" for savvy traders, but not an opportunity to get rich quickly or to make
money without substantial risk. The number of people who actually do this is
limited, and they will consume their wealth or die before they take over the market.
One problem with developing such psychological models is that it seems equally
plausible, based on casual observation of human behavior in other aspects of life,
that asset demand should be influenced by temporary fads or speculative bubbles.
Such fads seem especially hard to model econometrically. Moreover, once we get
into a phychological theory such as this, there may no longer be a clear distinction
between discount rate movements and expected dividend movements. It could be that
stock prices fall in a recession partly because of consumption smoothing behavior.
Then, because the initial stock price fall creates a bear market psychology,
irrational expectations of declining future dividends are engendered.—40—
For those readers who are inclined to conclude squarely against the model, I leave
some questions. If stock prices move primarily due to large discount rate move-
ments but these discount rate movements do not correspond to movements in marginal
rates of substitutions then what is it that causes the discount rates to move
so much? If, on the other hand, the reader goes back to a rational expectations
model in which information about potential dividend movements, rather than discount
rate movements, causes stock prices to move, then since actual aggregate dividend
movements of such magnitude have never been observed, what is the source of infor-
mation about such potential movements? Can we be satisfied with a model which
attributes stock price movements and their business cycle correlation to public
rational expectations about movements in a variable which has, in effect, never
yet been observed to move?—41—
APPENDIX I
SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA
The real and nominal consumption series starting in 1929 are the annual
average personal consumption expenditure on nondurable goods and services series
from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States. The real and
nominal consumption series for 1889 to 1928 are Simon Kuznets flow of goods to
consumers (perishables, semi—durables and services), variant III, adjusted to cor-
respond to Commerce Department accounting practices as described by John Kendrick
and multiplied by the ratio of the Commerce Department series to the Kuznets—
Kendrick series for the year 1929. The resulting series is divided by the population
of the United States to arrive at a per capita series. The price index used to
deflate the nominal return series into real return series is the consumption deflator
implied by the nominal and real consumption series.
The nominal stock price series is the annual average Standard & Poor Monthly
Composite Stock Price Index, which is a continuation of the Cowles Commission
Common Stock Price Index. The dividend series from 1926 is "dividends per share...
12 month total adjusted to index,fourth quarter, from Standard and Poor statistical
service. For 1889 to 1925 total dividends are Cowles' series Da—l multiplied by
.1264 to correct for change in base year.
The Standard and Poor Stock Price Index, which is a continuation of
the Cowles Commission Stock Price Index, is, in the words of Cowles, "intended
to represent, ignoring the elements of Brokerage charges and taxes, what would
have happened to an investor's funds if he had bought at the beginning of 1871
all stocks quoted on the New York Stock Exchange, allocating his purchases
among the individual stocks in proportion to their total monetary value, and-42-
eachmonth up to 1937 had by the same criterion redistributed his holdings
among all quoted stocks."
The after—tax nominal commercial paper return figure is the productof
one plus the after tax commercial paper rate for Julyand one plus the after—tax
commercial paper rate for January of the following year where the rateis for prime
4—6 month commercial paper as reported by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (1943) and the Federal Reserve Bulletin (Passim).
A printout and description of all data used in this paper is available from
the author on request.—43-.
NOTES
1. If we include in D dividends on shares exchanged when the company is acquired
or merged, and if we inc'ude in D any value at time of ultimate liquidation, then
we may assume that (4) holds at all times. It follows then that the only exogenous
characteristic of a security which influences price and hence which might cause it
to have an expected return which is different from that of another security is the
stochastic behavior of D. Earnings are relevant only as information useful in
predicting dividends.
2. How then may one describe what kinds of dividendprocesses cause securities to
have high expected returns? Formai]y, one may proceed by substituting expression
(6) for Pt into the expression Rt = +D+i)/P and tak.ing expect.ed
values. The resulting expression for E(R) is, however, difficult to inter-
pret. One might guess that securities whose dividend D+1 is highly correlated
with u'(Ct÷i)/u'(c) would have high expected returns. It is easilyseen,
however, that this guess is wrong. Consider an example in whichC1/C is log—
normally distributed independently of all information at time t, and log(C+i/C)
has mean p and variance 2 Suppose the dividend at time t+l is related to
Ct+i/Ct by Dt+l (C+l/C)b and it is known with certainty that no dividends
will be paid thereafter. Then it is easily established that the expected
return E(R) =E(_l_ ) is equal to (l/)exp (A —1/2A2a2+ bAa2 ) orjust
the "sure" return (or expected return on an asset uncorrelated withS) times
exp (bAa2) .Thehigher b the higher the expected return, yet the correlation
between and u'(C÷i)/u' (ct) is maximized (and equals one) if b =—A.The
correlation between Dt and u'(C+1)/u'(C) in fact approaches zero as b
approaches infinity, so that assets with very high expected return would show
with virtually no correlation with u'(C+1)/u'(C). Moreover, a strong
positive association of log(D1) with log (C+1/C) is not necessary for high
expected return. Consider a stock for which it is known with certainty that
only one dividend will ever be paid, at time t+2. Suppose the amount of this—44—
Notes, continued
dividend is revealed at time t+l and equals D(C+lIC)b. Clearly its price at time
t+l will be proportional to the dividend of the stock in the preceding example,
and so its expected return )=E(P+i/P)
is also the sure rate
times exp (bA2). In this example the high expected return arises because
information about future dividends has a high covariance with u'(C+i)/u'(Ct).
3Hall (1981) has pointed out that the utility function may be generalized
to allow a separate global risk aversion parameter, by taking this utility
function to a power. Consideration of this utility function suggests that
the parameter estimated here might better be described as an intertemporal
substitution parameter rather than a risk aversion parameter.
4LeRoy and La Civita (1981) have also made the point that consumption
variability may induce stock price variability.
.Thus,if C =cos(wt) and Dt =I), g(o) cos(wt +(w))+ 5D/(l—5)
6. Nor do our data suggest this. A cross spectral analysis between C
and P for 1889 to 1950 shows a phase angle which crosses through zero where
coherence is strongest, i.e., at a wavelength of little over five years.
The phase does, however, show that P leads C by about six months at the
"business cycle" wavelength of 40 months.Since neither the individual spectra
nor the coherences between the individual series are particularly strong in the
vicinity of this frequency, ft is hard to see from this cross spectrum why
this lead has been singled out for attention by students of the business cycle.
7. Technically the phase angle does not tell us whether one series leads
another since for cycles of frequency w a lag ofradians can be described
as a lead of 2ll— radians. Traditional business cycle theorists clearly
resolved this ambiguity in favor of small ,asis done also here.
8. One may conclude, then, that Vart(CtA) <Vart(C),
by analogy to the corres-
ponding inequality for P and P. However, if P and Dt are stationary indetermin—
istic processes then CAt will not be stationary, and hence Vart(CAtA) depends-45-
Notes, continued
-A on t and does not have the same interpretation. Moreover,C does not
generally equal Et(CAt )whereCAt t0 < t < T is the consumption that an
individual would choose if he were told all future returns R at t
to+j 0
*
Instead, CAt would equal a constant times CAt. Consider for example a
perfect foresight world in which all income is derived from the initial
endowment Watt0 of the single asset. The individual's optimal consumption
if he knows all future returns at t0 < T is:
T—l T—l "u*' —1/A
CAtCAT( II R ) whereCAt =W +
j=O
t+j
2/A(R Rt0+l)Al + ...).
Inthe same world in which the individual is not told future returns and in
which returns are unforecastable and Rt is independent and identically




R.. Clearly, does not equal Et(CAt )while
j=t0
it is equal to Et(CAtA) as defined in the text.
9.Hansen, Richard and Singleton [1981] have shown some of the connection
between the traditional CAPM and this model. They consider the case in which
there exists a portfolio whose return, the "benchmark return" Rb, is proportional
at time t to S: Rbt = Then from (3) a l/E(S). They show that
the benchmark return is the return on the portfolio with the smallest conditional
second moment. If one computes the conditional efficient portfolio frontier
one can always find the point on the frontier with minimum second moment, and
it then follows that one can derive a beta relation using this portfolio which
obtains even conditional on subsets of information. In contrast, the market—46—
Notes, continued
portfolio does not generally lie on the frontier. Still,the model has. no
testable implications in the absence of data on S, because the modelrestrictions
are just sufficient to identify Rb.
10. Of course, nominal housing prices fell then. The large number of fore-
closures then is partly due to the incentive to default created by the lower
prices.
11. Fisher [1951] reports that in 1932 deeds recorded were about one—third
fewer in number than in 1929 for a sample of 9 counties chosen to be
representative of the country. He notes, however, that "there is some evi-
dence that the number of deeds representing bona fide sales is not a constant
proportion of deed recordations" His estimated number of foreclosures
was 80% higher in 1932 than in 1929; foreclosures accounted for 9% of
all deed recordings in a small sample in 1938.—47--
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